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MRS. FOOT ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF 
HYPOTH ETICAL IMPERATIVES* 
by 
Lewis White Beck 1 
I 
Mrs. Philippa Foot proposes two possible ethical syscems which contain only 
hypothetical imperatives and which, she holds, are immune to any weighty ob­
jections Kant could bring against chem. 
First. a moral system could contain only hypothetical imperatives if the word 
'should' were applied in case, and only in case, the "right connection" could be 
round between the action which is said to be the one the agent should do and tihat 
agent's interests or desires (p. 139). The "right connection" is that the act so 
commanded or commended furthers these desires or interests. These desires and 
interests are distinguished from inclinations. The set of imperatives would be a 
praccical working system of morality if the agent's interests or desires were shared 
with others in ,a social group. Within the social group the word 'should' could be 
used in a grammatically categorical way though it would be understood, at least by 
the more reflective members of the group, always as hypothetical. The ethical 
language would be different from ours, for it would lack "one of the many in­
struments we have for expressing a hostile attitude" towards those who do not share 
our desires and interests. But she bolds that "it would not matter at all if we made 
Lhis change in our usage". 
Second, there could be a moral system in which "moral considerations are 
considered to be reasons for acting only when related to the desires or interests of 
the agent" (p. 1 40). Mrs. Foot does not make it entirely clear what she means by 
either "moral considerations" or "desires or interests of the agent". As it stands, this 
description could fit Kant's own theory, at least in so far as he assumes that one of 
the interests (ii not a "desire", properly so-called) of men is to act out of moral 
considerations. But since she distinguishes "moral considerations" from "desires or 
interests", and holds that the former are effective only when standing in a positive 
relation to the latter, she must be using each of the terms in some restricted sense 
which would prevent the application of her description to the Kantian ethics. Just 
how these restrictions are to be made, however, is a difficult question. 
Now only if the "moral considerations" can or ought to be effective without our 
establishing a positive relation of them to "desires or interests". is there a 
categorical imperative to act out of consideration for the moral. Otherwise aJI 
imperatives are hypothetical, even those directed to the effectuation of moral ends 
such as the atnainment of virtue. Mrs. Foot can find no more reason to obey a 
categorical imperative in ethics than in etiquette, but she appears to want to use !the 
language of ordinary ethics instead of the language of mere prudence, so I believe 
she prefers System II to System 1. 2 
System II seems to be proposed as what really underlies "the ordinary ratio·nal 
knowledge of morality", which is the starting point also for Kant's analysis in the 
• A l l  future publication rights reserved by the author. 
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Foundations. But what each of them finds most significant in the ordinary moral 
consciousness, of course, is very different. For Kant holds that the "moral con· 
siderat ion" is autonomous, that is, it does not borrow its force from its association 
with what are narrowly considered to be an agent's desires or interests. 
The point at issue between Kant and Mrs. Foot is not an empirical one. Mrs. Foot 
is prepared to agree (p. J 4 1 )  that a man may do something because he tells himself 
that "only thus will he be acting in conformity with reason": she wants, as it were, to 
ask if it is really reasonable for him to do so. And Kant believes that the categorical· 
moral 'ought' can have force to move a man to action even when it is not associated 
with his interests, but h e  is not so sure that it is an empirical fact that it alone ever 
has moved a man.3 Mrs. Foot seems to believe that something that can happen (a 
man moved by moral considerations divorced from interests and desires) is: without 
justification (which can come only from association with interests or desires): while 
Kant believes that the same thing ought to happen (would be justified if it hap· 
pened) but is dubious about whether it ever does happen! 
Yet I am not entirely sure whether Mrs. Foot sees the issue as one of conceptual 
analysis instead of fact. In her paper, "Moral Beliefs", she denied that an 
autonomous answer to the question of why l should not do t> , viz., "because G> is 
unjust". "gives a reason (for not doing 0 )  in so far as any reasons can ever be given. 
(It) gives a reason only if the nature of justice can be shown to be such that it is 
necessa rily4 connected with what a man wants." Now if she will forgive me for 
saying so, this struck me, when I first read it ten years ago, as being as dogmatic as 
any of Kant's assertions to the contrary. And it seems to me to be refuted by the 
fact which she was prepared to agree to (cf. the previous paragraph), by the fact 
that not all men are like Tbrasymachus, or that many not unreflective men are 
satisfied with the answer, "(b would be unjust" as an answer which "bring(s) the 
series (of why·not·do-0 -questions) to a close . . . ".6 
T think Mrs. Foot means that morally autonomous reasons are not good reasons, 
not successful candidates for the status of final answers. For she says that she has 
"never found anyone who could explain the use of the word ('ought')" except where 
it "relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette" (p.143). But 
to "explain the use of it", though not perhaps to justify it as a good use, seems to me 
to be just to point out cases in which it does function, satisfactorily to the user of it, 
to bring the series of why-questions to a close. To a person who uses the word in 
this way, it would seem lo miss his point to ask him further, "But why should you do 
it, granting that it is your duty to do it" or "But why should you do � , granting that 
0 is just?" 
II 
Mrs. Foot does not fall into either of two common errors, made by many eminent 
philosophers, of holding that Kant does not admit any purpose in moral acts or, 
alternatively. of granting that be did so only at the cost of inconsistency. In a 
generally overlooked sentence, which Mrs. Foot much have taken very seriously, 
he said. "It is certainly undeniable that every volition must have an object and 
therefore a material."7 The issue between her and Kant is therefore a genuine one, 
not. as is often the case, a spurious one arising from a misreading of Kant. 
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The issue is: Does the reason why one ought to d o  0 always lie in expected 
desired consequences of doing 0 ,  so that the command, "Do 0 " ,  is hypotbetical? 
Mrs. Foot answers yes, and holds chat a command, "You ought to do 0 " which uses 
the word 'ought' as "free-floating and unsubscripted" is unintelligible (p. 143). 
I think her argument for chis is stronger against an intuirioniscic (what I have 
elsewhere called pejoratively a "ritualistic") theory of obligation than it is against 
Kant's. Kant almost never lets the variable � in "Do II> " stand for the name of an 
act in the sense in which Mrs. Foot and all of us most of the time understand "act". 
''Do 0 "  for Kant means: "Act on maxim X", where X names a maxim that bas 
cer1ain well known characteristics. Maxim X defines an ac1ion or a class of actions 
which arc categorically obligatory only in a parasitic or derivative sense. The only 
act which the categorical imperative commands in an irreducibly categorical 
manner is lo have and to act on a maxim of a certain kind. The categorical im· 
pera1ive is a second·order principle serving as a criterion of hypothetical im­
peratives which may legitimately be obeyed; 8 and hence ''There is only one 
categorical imperative." 9 
Such a criteria! principle is needed. because not every aggregate or even system 
of human wan ls and interests which generate hypothetical imperatives is of equal 
worth with every other. Mrs. Foot seems to deny this (p. 142, lines 37ff), but I must 
confess that I believe I find something wrong with an ethical system which does not 
authorize us to say that a system of hypothetical imperatives is immoral because 
they are contingent upon unworthy ends. Such a conclusion did not follow from the 
arguments she put forward in "Moral Beliefs", where she gave a good, quasi­
empirical and naturalistic, argument in support of ordinary virtues and justice. 
Kant's categorical imperative is that aU the maxims I act upon should be 
universalizable, should conform to such ends as the happiness o! others and my 
own moral perfection, or should qualify me as a lawgiving member of a kingdom of 
ends in which humanity (rational nature) is an end-setting end in itself. Actions may 
qualify under some one aspect of these maxims which would not qualify under 
another: and Kant believes (erroneously, in my opinion) that actions whose specific 
maxim (rule) cannot be universalized are maxims which cannot be legitimized by 
the categorical imperative.'0 But it is the choice of the specific maxim (rule) 
because of its conforO}ity to the general maxim which authorizes it, not the con· 
formity of the specific maxim to some intended end - though both conformities 
may be present in moral acts -which gives an autonomously obligatory character 
to the specific action commanded. 
The purpose of the famous examples in Foundations I is to do the 
Gedankenexperiment of suspending the second of these conformities to see if the 
first alone suffices to render the action obligatory, not to see if the first alone is 
suffic1e11t to move a man to do his duty. I am not sure that all the experiments have 
the oulcome Kant thought they did; the suicide case seems to me to be especially 
dubious, but the benevolence case turns out, in my opinion. very well, showing that 
one ought categorically to act benevolently even if one is unmoved by sympathy or 
enlightened self-interest. 
Instead of accepting the concern with the general good as a brute psychological 
datum if it is present, or being morally indifferent (but perhaps not practically 
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indifferent) to its absence when it is absent (as I think Mrs. Foot (p. 142) is com­
mitted to being), Kant thinks he has given a reason why we ought to do benevolent 
actions., and a reason that is not dependent upon what we want except insofar as we 
are beings endowed with a pure practical reason. 
ll1 
In conclusion I would like to ask Mrs. Foot to consider with me another com­
parison than the one she drew between ethics and etiquette. It is that between 
ethics and logic. 
Logic is full of categorical imperatives. "One ought to avoid the falllacy of 
denying the antecedent;" "One ought to make inductions only from fair samples," 
elc. Why? Certainly we can say, ''If you want to be consistent, you ought to reason 
validly." Though this imperative is hypothetical in form, it is what 1 have 
elsewhere II called an "apodictic imperative" - hypothetical in form, but apodictic 
in modality. But we do not give a sufficient reason for avoidling a logical fallacy by 
saying, "You want to have a good reputation as a logician" or "Remember you want 
to live in good faith with your neighbors." The proper goal of "doing right logically" 
is a logical goal, i.e., a goal which is definable only in logical terms and unin­
telligible to anyone who does not know and, at least generally, adhere to logical 
standards. The other answers, though no doubt true, are vacuous with respect to 
telling ·us the ways and means to achieve the end. Logic defines the goal as well as 
prescribing the means to achieve it, and does so in one imperative; being logical is 
just avoiding logical fallacies. 
Similarly it seems to me that the goal of morality - and Kant never denies it has 
a goal - cannot be defined except in moral terms, or at least cannot be defined 
without the use of some moral terms (such as "worthiness" to be happy). If I am 
correct, then there is a more intimate connection between moral action and moral 
goal than the contingent 12 one which underlies the hypothetical imperative. To be 
worthy of happiness is to act on maxims of a certain sort, just as to be consistent is 
to reason according to certain rules. In neither case is the goal definable without 
our knowing what actions have a necessary relation to this goal, and this relation is 
not a causal one.12 
Next Mrs. Foot compares etiquette and ethics with respect to two putatively 
common features,their"inescapability"(pp.144-l 45)and the categoricalness of their 
imperatives. She asks,."Has anything been said about the inescapability of morality 
which could not also be said about the inescapability of eti:quette?" Yes: d'autres 
temps, d'autres moeurs. 
To be sure, she is right in saying that I cannot be indifferent to our local code of 
etiquette without incurring blame for disccurtesy. But I can find another land 
where an act that would be discourteous here would be indifferent or even man­
daled. Now in at least one passage Mrs. Foot thinks moral practices are like 
courtesies or customs; there are "rules of conduct adopted by certain societies, and 
individuals within these societies", and "Kant is saying these rules are universally 
valid."13 But che rules which are enshrined in the Kantian categorical imperative 
are not first-order rules such as "Give to beggars," which are perhaps comparable 
to rules such as "Take off your hat in an elevator." They are second-order prin-
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ciples, rules to do acts which are comprehended by a certain general maxim, and 
the specific act commanded may vary with circumstances. The truly inescapable 
moral rules are these second-order principles. 14 In this respect, the categorical 
imperati'e is more like a rule in logic than a rule in etiquette. For all the rules of 
logic are as it were second (or higher) order principles which become (or give rise 
to) rirst-order principles by being interpreted, with constants substituted for 
variables. The inescapability of morality is thus more like that of logic than it is like 
that of etiquette. 
Finally, this analogy goes still farther. It is impossible, I think, to give an 
argument, which does not beg the question, to the effect that one should reason 
logically. Similarly i t  seems to Mrs. Foot that it is impossible to give a moral 
argument to the effect that one ought to be moral. This is equally the view of Kant, 
but he draws a very different inference from it. He says, "We do not indeed 
comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative; yet we 
do comprehend its incomprehensibility . . .  "15 Mrs. Foot doesn't like in­
comprehensibilities, and supplies a condition under which the moral 'ought' 
becomes comprehensible. viz., an antecedent having co do with wants or interests. 
But Kant, having to choose between admitting the incomprehensible and 
"corrupting (moral laws) in their very foundations and destroying their dignity", t6 
did not "blame reason for being unwilling to explain (the moral law) by a condition . 
. . for the law would then cease to be moral." t7 (I would be a great deal less 
peremptory. but I could not refrain from quoting what I believe Kant would have 
thought of Mrs. Foot's explanation of the moral 'ought'.) 
NOTES 
1 I am Indebted to my colleague, Professor Robert L. Holmes. for comments on "n e"rller draft of this 
paper. 
2. But I cannot be sure she does. Her statement (p. 1 4 3  ), "I am pulling forward quite seriously a theory that 
disallows lhe posslbllity that a man ought . . .  lo have ends other than those he does have" means at least that 
She has no THEO RETICAL Objection 10 System 1 .  
3. FOUNDAT IONS O F  THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Libera! Arts ed.), p. 23. 
"· Why "necessarily"? See footnote 12. 
S In her THEORIES OF ETHICS. p. 98. 
6. I B I D., 98 
7 CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Liberal Arts ed.), p. 34. 
8. See my COMMENTARY ON KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, pp. 85, 119. 
9 FOUNDATIONS, p. 39. 
10. Kanl ouohl 10 hc:ve poinled oul that aciions whose specific maxims (rules) can be unlversallzed do no1 
thereby meet the SUFFICIENT condition for being obllgatory 
11. STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KAN,T, Pl). 177 199. 
12. 17 See footnote ' 
13. I have argued In detail that Kant is not guilty of "universalizing" a "provlncl111 moral code" in my ed. of 
FOUNDATIONS, p xix.xx 
14 Maybe I here are second order principles in etiquette which CAN be universalized, e.g., "When in Rome do 
as the Romans do" Bui such an imperalive, lhOugh categorical In form, is hypolhellcat In intent, being 
addrr.ssed to those who v1ish to be socially accepted in Rome, Hongkong, and Brockport. 
IS FOUNDATIONS, last paragraph. 
16 I B I D ,  p 21 
17 I Ar 0 , last parllgrnph 
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